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For prisoners seeking relief from their convictions and sentences on
collateral review, the question of whether a new rule announced by the U.S.
Supreme Court is substantive or procedural is vital. If the rule is substantive, it
will be available to provide the prisoner relief.' If it is procedural, it is unlikely
to be available to provide relief, unless the rule falls within very narrow
exceptions.2 As a result, the classification of a new rule as substantive or
procedural can impact who remains imprisoned and who goes free. 3

Law Clerk, The Honorable Henry M. Herlong, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the District of
South Carolina. J.D., 2013, University of South Carolina School of Law; M.A., 2005, University of
South Carolina; B.A., 2003, Wofford College. The views expressed herein are the Author's own
and are not purported to reflect the views of his employers, past or present.
1. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).
2.
See id. at 352.
3.
See Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity
Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court's
Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 161-62 (2005) (using a hypothetical example to demonstrate how
identical cases, one pending on direct review and one pending on collateral review, can result in
wildly different outcomes) (citations omitted); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to
Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
203, 232-33 (2011) (discussing the importance of attorneys keeping their clients' cases on direct
review while awaiting a decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 27 (2005), to ensure
its application to their cases).
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The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on retroactivity is a relatively new
phenomenon in American law.
That jurisprudence has embraced a binary
approach to retroactivity, and new rules fall within one of two categories:
procedural rules or substantive rules.5 Despite the Supreme Court's embrace of
this dichotomy, however, the rules announced in its opinions and lower courts'
opinions do not always fit neatly within either category. Rather, the rules
announced in these cases may appear to fall within both categories, as procedural
rules can have substantive applications and substantive rules require some
procedural operation to take effect. 6 While this confusion provides fodder for
law review articles and student notes, the ambiguity leaves lower courts with
difficult decisions regarding how to categorize new rules and whether to apply
those rules retroactively on collateral review.
The Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Carachuri-Rosendov. Holder8 and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's application of the Carachuri
rule in United States v. Simmons9 represent the kinds of cases whose rules do not
fit neatly within either category. Neither case indicated whether the rule
announced was procedural or substantive, nor whether the rule would apply
retroactively on collateral review. 10 As a result, the Fourth Circuit was quickly
forced to address those unanswered questions in United States v. PowellII and
Miller v. United States.12 Given the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence,
the only way to answer the retroactivity question is to place the cases within one
of the two categories: substantive or procedural. In Powell, which determined
Carachuri's retroactivity,13 and Miller, which determined Simmons's
retroactivity,14 the Fourth Circuit reached opposite conclusions.
In doing so,
the Fourth Circuit provided little guidance as to whether it will likely conclude

4.
See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of
Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1999) (outlining the history of retroactivity
jurisprudence).
5.
See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted) (discussing the jurisprudence
regarding new substantive rules and new rules of procedure).
6.
See Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1828
(2003) ("Relatively little has been written about the distinction between substantive and procedural
law in general.").
7.
See, e.g., id. at 1825 (arguing that United States v. Ring, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), is
substantive and therefore retroactive on collateral review); Nicholas J. Eichenseer, Comment,
Reasonable Doubt in the Rear-View Mirror: The Case for Blakely-Booker Retroactivity in the
FederalSystem, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2005) (arguing that Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), provided substantive rules that
were retroactively applicable on collateral review).
8.
560 U.S. 563 (2010).
9.
649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011).
10. See generally Carachuri,130 S. Ct. at 2577; Simmons, 649 F.3d at 237.
11. 691 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2012).
12. 735 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2013).
13. Powell, 691 F.3d at 556.
14. Miller, 735 F.3d at 145.
15. See Powell, 691 F.3d at 559-60; Miller, 735 F.3d at 147.
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that new rules are substantive or procedural for purposes of collateral review.
Despite the confusion resulting from the opinions' blurring the line between
procedural and substantive rules, Judge King's dissent in Powell and the court's
opinion in Miller demonstrate that new rules with both substantive and
procedural applications can fit within the existing framework.16 However, given
the Supreme Court's recent order for the Fourth Circuit to revisit its decision in
Newbold v. United States,1 the Fourth Circuit may be clarifying its own
jurisprudence soon.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Retroactivity Standard

The standard for whether a new rule announced by the Supreme Court is
retroactively applicable on collateral review appears straightforward. New rules
are "applie[d] to all criminal cases still pending on direct review."
Thus, all
new rules apply prospectively. 19 However, for convictions that are already
final-in other words, for those who are seeking relief on collateral review the
new rule "applies only in limited circumstances."20 According to the Court,
"New substantive rules generally apply retroactively."21 To be considered
substantive, the rule must "alter[] the range of conduct or the class of persons
that the law punishes."2 2 A procedural rule is one that "merely regulates the
manner of determining the defendant's culpability."23 Although new procedural
rules do not generally apply retroactively, an exception exists for "watershed
rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceeding." 24

16. See Powell, 691 F.3d at 560-66 (King, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Miller, 735 F.3d
at 142-47 (citations omitted).
17. No. 12-10871, 134 S. Ct. 897 (Mem.) (Jan. 13, 2014) (remanding the case to the Fourth
Circuit to rehear the case from United States v. Newbold, 490 F. App'x 614 (4th Cir. 2012)).
18. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
314, 328 (1987)).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. United States v. Powell, 691 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at
353).
23. Id. (quotingSchriro, 542 U.S. at 353 (internal quotations omitted)).
24. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Very few cases have met this high standard. The Fourth Circuit has noted that the
Supreme Court "has repeatedly implied that the only procedural rules deserving of retroactive
application are those that are comparable in importance to Gideon v. Wainwright, which
incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the States." Id. (internal citations
omitted) (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). As one commenter has put it, "The rule is easily
paraphrased: nothing is as important as Gideon, so nothing is retroactive." Justin F. Marceau,
Gideon's Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2488 (2013).
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The Supreme Court Decision

In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, the Supreme Court addressed what
qualifies as an aggravated felony for purposes of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA).25 The defendant was a lawful permanent resident who
faced deportation after committing two misdemeanor drug possession crimes in
Texas.26 He sought cancellation of his removal or waiver of inadmissibility
under the INA, which allows the Attorney General to provide such relief as long
as the applicant has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.27 To be
convicted of an aggravated felony, the defendant would have to have been
convicted of a drug trafficking crime, which would be a felony punishable under
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).28 A felony requires punishment for more
than one year.29 The CSA provides that a recidivist offender charged with
simple possession could be sentenced to more than one year, but a nonrecidivist
offender could not be sentenced to more than one year.3 0 The Court explained
that it is not the conduct of the offender that determines what constitutes an
aggravated felony; rather, the Court said it must "look to the conviction
itself ... not to what might have or could have been charged."3 1 As a result,
although "the conduct prohibited by state law must be punishable as a felony
under federal law," "the defendant must also have been actually convicted of a
crime that is itself punishable as a felony under federal law."3 2 In this case,
because the defendant was not charged and convicted of his second simple
possession as a recidivist offense, his crimes were not punishable as a felony
under federal law and he was eligible for discretionary relief under the INA. 33
C. The Fourth CircuitApplies Carachuri
After deciding Carachuri,the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's
original decision in United States v. Simmons.34 In Simmons, the Fourth Circuit
applied Carachurito hold that a district court must look to a defendant's actual
conviction rather than a hypothetical conviction-for the maximum crime with
which a defendant could have been charged in determining whether a defendant
had committed a felony offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one

25. Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2580.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2580-81 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012)).
28. Id. at 2581 (citing Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012)).
29. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012)).
30. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2102)).
31. Id. at 2586.
32. Id. at 2589.
33. Id. at 2589-90.
34. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 239-40 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing
Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2577). For the procedural history prior to the Fourth Circuit's en banc
opinion in Simmons, see id.
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year under the CSA. 35 In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of
possession with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana, but at his
sentencing, he objected to the Government's use of a 1996 North Carolina
conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana to increase his
mandatory minimum sentence.36 The statute increased the mandatory minimum
sentence from five years to ten years if the individual committed the crime "after
a prior conviction for a felony drug offense ha[d] become final."3
The
defendant's North Carolina charge could not have resulted in a term of
imprisonment greater than one year under North Carolina law. 38 The court
explained that, under the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act, an
individual could have received more than one year of imprisonment if (1) the
state proved or the defendant pleaded to aggravating factors warranting a higher
sentence, and (2) the state showed that the defendant had at least fourteen
criminal history points that would have increased the defendant's prior record
level to five.39 However, North Carolina did not meet these two criteria for the
defendant's prior conviction.40 Prior Fourth Circuit precedent allowed the court
to look at the "maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that
crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history, and the court
previously determined that the defendant's offense was punishable for a term of
greater than one year.42 The Supreme Court, however, vacated Simmons's
judgment and ordered the case to be reconsidered.43
Reviewing the Supreme Court's Carachuri opinion, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that its prior reasoning was no longer good law. 44 The court
explained that "' [t]he conviction itself must serve as [its] 'starting place."' 45
Because the North Carolina state court did not make a recidivist finding that
would allow the defendant to receive a higher sentence, the Government had no
finding on which it could seek the enhanced sentence. 46 The court also
explained that the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act mandated the
defendant's sentence and prevented the state court judge from imposing a higher
sentence, and the defendant could not have been sentenced to a term greater than
one year.47 Further, the court stated that "Carachuri also forbids [the court]

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
(2012)).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 248-50 (citations omitted).
Id. at 239.
Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (2012)).
Id. at 239-40 (quoting United States v. Simmons, 340 F. App'x 141, 143 (4th Cir. 2009)).
Id. at 240-41 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.16(a), -1340.14(c)(5), -1340.17(c)(d)
Id. at 241.
Id. (quoting United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005)).
Id. (referring to Simmons, 340 F. App'x at 141).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 576 (2010)).
Id. (citing Carachuri,560 U.S. at 577 n.12).
Id. at 244 (citing United States v. Rodriquez, 533 U.S. 337, 390 (2008)).
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from considering hypothetical agravating factors when calculating" a
defendant's maximum punishment.
Thus, just as the Court in Carachurisaid
that it could not look to the conduct of the defendant but could look only to the
conviction for purposes of the INA, the Fourth Circuit explained that it must
look to the defendant's conviction itself.49 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit read
Carachuri as "ma[king] clear that when a state statute provides a harsher
punishment applicable only to recidivists, it creates different 'offenses' for the
purpose of federal sentencing enhancements."o Therefore, the same conduct
could constitute different offenses, de ending on whether a recidivist finding
was made to support the conviction.
Because the defendant's 1996 North
Carolina conviction did not include a recidivist finding, "his 'offense' was not
'punishable' by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, which is reserved
for repeat offenders."52
III. POWELL AND MILLER: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DECIDES RETROACTIVITY
A.

United States v. Powell

In United States v. Powell, the Fourth Circuit held that Carachuriannounced
a new procedural rule and, therefore, did not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review.5 3 In Powell, the defendant's federal conviction was for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine
and at least fifty grams of crack cocaine.54 He received a sentence of 240
months' imprisonment as a result of an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence
imposed because of the defendant's previous drug conviction in North Carolina,
which had resulted in a term of six to eight months' imprisonment. 5 The
defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking the court to vacate his
sentence pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Carachuri.56 Because six
years had passed since his sentencing, the defendant's motion would have been
57
barred by § 2255's statute of limitations.
However, § 2255(f)(3) allows a
defendant to seek relief within one year of a newly recognized right by the
Supreme Court if the Supreme Court has made the right retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review. Thus, for Carachurito be available as an avenue

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 244.
Id. (quoting Carachuri,560 U.S. at 576).
Id. at 246.
Id. (citing Carachuri,560 U.S. at 567-68 n.3).
Id. at 247.
United States v. Powell, 691 F.3d 554, 560 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 555-56.
Id.
See id. (noting that Powell's motion was untimely).
Id. at 557 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)) (2012).
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for relief for the defendant, the Fourth Circuit had to conclude that Carachuri
was retroactive on collateral review.5 9
Applying the standard for retroactivity, the majority stated that "Carachuri
is best understood as articulating a procedural rule rather than a substantive
one." 60 The majority framed Carachurias "prescrib[ing] the manner in which to
construe" the statutory condition that the defendant must have been "convicted
of any aggravated felony." 61 To satisfy that condition, "a court must look to the
defendant's record of conviction, not to a hypothetical conviction which could
have been prosecuted in the circumstances."
For the majority, this holding
"altered neither 'the range of conduct' nor the 'class of persons' that could be
punished under any criminal statute." 63 The range of conduct remained the
same: simple possession.64 The class of persons remained the same: recidivist
possessors could receive a sentence of up to two years' imprisonment, while
nonrecidivist drug possessors could receive no more than a year. Accordingly,
the majority explained that "[t]he only novelty introduced by Carachuri [was]
the procedure for determining whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as
an aggravated felony."66 This resulted in a requirement that the record of
conviction must include a finding that the defendant was, in fact, a recidivist.67
Accordingly, Carachuri "relates to the manner of determining the potential
punishment for an offense based on the facts disclosed by the judicial record"
and constitutes "a quintessential procedural rule."68 To further support its
analysis, the majority explained that Simmons "extracted the interpretive
principles and procedural requirements outlined in Carachurifrom the statutory
context in which they initially arose and applied them."69 For the majority,
Simmons thus serves as an example of the court applying a procedural rule. As
a result, the court held that Carachuriannounced a procedural rule that does not
apply retroactively on collateral review.
Judge King, who concurred in the judgment in part, dissented in part
because he "strongly disagree[d] with the majority's analysis."72 Judge King
argued that Carachuricould be applied in a way that would meet the criteria for
retroactivity.73 In addition to the example of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), which was the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 556.
Id. at 558.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 559 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)).
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 560 (King, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351).
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statute at issue in Simmons,74 Judge King applied Carachuri to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), the statute that prevents felons from possessing a firearm.
Judge
King explained that, under these statutes, "Carachuri revealed that many
defendants . . . were convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or

[received] a punishment that the law cannot impose upon them." 76 Judge King
reframed Carachuriin terms of its application in statutory interpretation, stating
that Carachuri "narrowe[d] the definition of a convicted felon under §
922(g)(1) ... to only those prior offenders who actually face" a sentence of more
than a year. For Judge King, viewing the Supreme Court's decision in terms of
its effect on statutory interpretation was entirely consistent with Fourth Circuit
precedent, and he noted that the Fourth Circuit had previously found a case
retroactive that narrowed the interpretation of use in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).78
Returning to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), the statute under which the defendant was
sentenced, Judge King explained that Carachurilimited the possible maximum
statutory sentence for all defendants who were sentenced under § 841(b), other
than those sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(A).
Judge King then turned to the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits for support, arguing that a rule that limits the
exposure to a longer sentence than the defendant would have faced without the
rule is substantive, warranting retroactive application.8 0 Under this analysis, the
defendant would not have been eligible for relief because he faced the same
maximum sentence with the enhancement at issue in the case as without it.81
Turning to the majority's analysis and conclusion that the rule from
Carachuriis purely procedural, Judge King classified the opinion as "patently
wrong."82 Judge King recognized that Carachuricontains a "procedural aspect"
that the Fourth Circuit had previously applied in Simmons.8 3 However, Judge
King saw Carachuri's"consequent narrowing of the pool of prior offenders
subject to, inter alia, enhanced penalties . . . and even criminal liability" as an

additional "innovation." 84 Judge King framed Carachurias "alter[ing] both the
range of permissible methods . . . and the range of conduct."85 As a result, Judge

King concluded that Carachuri formulated a "substantive rule eligible for
retroactive application." 86 Judge King's only concern was that, in announcing

74. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2011).
75. See Powell, 691 F.3d at 560.
76. Id. (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 561 (citing United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 534, 538 (4th Cir. 2010)).
78. Id. (citing Thomas, 627 F.3d at 538 (holding a rule that narrowed the scope of the word
use to be substantive and applicable retroactively)).
79. Id. at 562.
80. Id. at 562-63 (citing Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1090, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009)).
81. Id. at 563.
82. Id. at 564.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
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Carachurias retroactive, individuals with meritorious claims would have missed
the deadline for submitting an application under § 2255, and he looked forward
to the Fourth Circuit's opportunity to recharacterize Carachurias retroactive in
the future.
B. Miller v. United States
Initially, in light of Powell, the Fourth Circuit decided cases as if Simmons
does not operate retroactively on collateral review. In Miller v. United States,
however, the Fourth Circuit reversed course and held that, although Carachuriis
not a substantive rule, Simmons is a substantive rule and operates retroactively. 89
The defendant in Miller was convicted in 2008 of one count of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 90 Pursuant
to § 922(g)(1), a person who "has been convicted in any court of[] a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" may not possess a
firearm. 91 Prior to his § 922(g)(1) conviction, the defendant had been convicted
in North Carolina state court for felony possession of cocaine and for threatening
a court officer.92 The defendant's criminal history provided him with a
maximum sentence of eight months' imprisonment for each crime under the
North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act. 93 Under pre-Simmons Fourth Circuit
precedent, however, both convictions were considered "punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" because a hypothetical defendant
could have received a sentence for greater than one year. 94 Both the defendant
and the Government agreed that Simmons impacted what constitutes such a
crime under § 922(g)(1), but the question facing the court was whether the
defendant would be eligible for relief under Simmons because its rule was not in
effect at the time he had exhausted his appeals. 95
Miller argued, and the court agreed, that Simmons announced a new
substantive rule and, as a result, Simmons applies retroactively. 96 According to
the court, Simmons requires courts to examine "how much prison time the
defendant was exposed to given his own criminal history at the time he was

87. See id. at 565-66.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 520 F. App'x 234, 234 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Under Powell,
the rulings in Carachuri-Rosendo and Simmons are not applicable to Peters' § 2255 motion.");
United States v. Newbold, 490 F. App'x 614, 615 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014)
("Under Powell, Carachuri-Rosendoand Simmons do not afford Newbold habeas relief."); United
States v. Moton, 496 F. App'x 330, 331 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that Powell precluded
retroactive application of Simmons).
89. 735 F.3d 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2013).
90. Id. at 142.
91. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (2012).
92. Miller, 735 F.3d at 143.
93. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A- 1340.17(c), (d) (2012)).
94. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011)).
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sentenced and any aggravating factors that were actually alleged against him." 97
Thus, under Simmons, if criminal defendants could not have received a sentence
of more than a year, defendants who were convicted of violating § 922(g)(1) "are
actually innocent of the ... offense of which they were convicted."98
Although Simmons was applying Carachuri,the court was careful to explain
that it was not Carachurithat announced the new substantive rule. 99 Rather,
Simmons, in applying Carachuri, announced the new substantive rule.100 The
court concluded that Simmons announce a new substantive rule because it
"narrowed the scope of § 922(g)(1) by establishing that it does not reach
defendants whose prior convictions could not have resulted in a sentence of more
than one year in prison" and "altered the class of persons that the law
punishes."
According to the court, this reading of Simmons conforms to
recent Supreme Court precedent announcing new substantive rules.102
The court was also careful to explain why Powell did not dictate the
outcome of Miller, noting that Powell sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.103
Section 2255(f) contains a statute of limitations provision that limits when
§ 2255 motions can be filed.104 Powell sought relief under Carachuri,and to
determine whether his § 2255 motion was timely, the court had to determine
whether Carachuriannounced a new substantive rule, which would have shifted
his one-year time frame. o0
When the court determined Carachuri's
retroactivity, it concluded that Carachuri is procedural because Carachuri
"looks only at whether a certain procedure was followed."1 06 Because Powell
examined only Carachuri'sretroactivity, it had no impact on whether Simmons
announced a substantive rule. 107 Thus, Simmons applied Carachuri'sprocedure,
resulting in a "narrow[ing] [of] the class of offenders and range of conduct that
can be subject to punishment."108

97. Id. at 146.
98. Id.
99. Id. Indeed, although it goes unsaid, the panel could not have determined Carachuri to
announce a new substantive rule because doing so would have contradicted Powell. As a published
opinion of the Fourth Circuit, Powell could only have been overturned by a published en banc
opinion of the court. See Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1975)
(stating that a decision of the same court of appeals "is binding, not only upon the district court, but
also upon another panel of [the same] court unless and until it is reconsidered en banc").
100. Miller, 735 F.3d at 146.
101. Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
102. Id. (citing Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 83 (2007); Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 620 21 (1998); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1995)).
103. Id. (citing United States v. Powell, 691 F.3d 554, 555 (4th Cir. 2012)).
104. Id. at 146-47 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012)).
105. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)).
106. Id. at 147.
107. See id. (citing Powell, 691 F.3d at 557).
108. Id. Judge King wrote a short concurrence to restate his belief that Carachuriwas also
retroactive on review. See id. (King, J., concurring).
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ANALYSIS

When read together, the Fourth Circuit's opinions in Miller and Powell
provide inconsistent guidance for distinguishing procedural and substantive
rules. Both the majority in Powell and the court's opinion in Miller applied a
rule that requires lower courts to consider the actual record of conviction to
determine whether recidivist enhancements could be triggered under a statute. 109
However, the two Fourth Circuit opinions reached opposite conclusions as to
whether those rules qualify as substantive or procedural rules.1 10 While the court
in Miller characterized Powell in a way that minimizes the inconsistency
between the two opinions, the court's distinction of Powell rested largely on its
procedural context without distinguishing the court's rationale. 1 1 Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit panel in Miller may not have been able to distinguish Powell
without coming dangerously close to overruling it, which the panel would not
have been able to do. 112 Although the court's opinion in Miller reads Simmons
as a substantive rule, the court's analysis suggests this classification is much less
clear.113
At various points throughout the Miller opinion, the court appears to
characterize Simmons in procedural terms similar to those used by the majority's
characterization of Carachuri in Powell. For example, in Miller, the court
characterized Simmons as holding "that a prior conviction under North Carolina
law is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment only if the defendant's
conviction, based on his individual offense characteristics and criminal history,
allowed for such a sentence."ll4 The court later added that "[t]he Simmons
decision changed the way this Court determines whether prior convictions for
certain lower-level North Carolina felonies are punishable by more than one year
in prison"115 and "Simmons requires the court to look at how much prison time
the defendant was exposed to given his own criminal history at the time he was
sentenced and any aggravating factors that were actually alleged against him."11 6
This analysis of Simmons echoes the Powell court's reading of Carachuri. The
majority's opinion in Powell described Carachuri as holding "that in
determining whether the condition is satisfied, a court must look to the
defendant's record of conviction, not to a hypothetical conviction which could

109. See id. at 144 (citing United States v. Simmons, 649 U.S. 237, 244 (4th Cir. 2011));
Powell, 691 F.3d at 559.
110. See Miller, 735 F.3d at 447; Powell, 691 F.3d at 559-60.
111. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
112. See Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating
that a decision of the same court of appeals "is binding, not only upon the district court, but also
upon another panel of [the same] court unless and until it is reconsidered en banc").
113. See Miller, 735 F.3d at 447.
114. Id. at 144 (citing Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244).
115. Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 146.
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have been prosecuted in the circumstances."1 1 As a result, the court explained
that "[t]he only novelty introduced by Carachuri is the procedure for
determining whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as an aggravated
felony.""' Thus, both opinions recognize that the significance of the rules they
were interpreting rested in part on a change in how courts determine what
qualifies as a felony.
In Powell, however, the court was content to simply characterize Carachuri
as procedural. 119 The problem with this analysis, as Judge King pointed out, is
that "the Carachurirule has numerous applications, including usages that narrow
the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, and thereby alter[ ] the
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes."l20 Judge King
effectively characterized Carachurias containing both a "procedural aspect" and
"substantive applications demanding to be retroactive."1 21 In other words, Judge
King's reasoning suggests that Carachuriblurred the line between procedural
and substantive rules.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Miller blurs this line again. Although the
opinion acknowledged Simmons's procedural impact,
the court also
characterized Simmons as substantive in holding "that a defendant's prior
conviction for which he could not have received more than a year in prison under
North Carolina's mandatory Structured Sentencing Act ... was not 'punishable'
by more than one year in prison and is not a felony offense for purposes of
federal law."l23 Thus, the court read Simmons as having aprocedural aspect by
its effect on the procedure used to determine whether someone is convicted of a
felony and sentenced to more than a year; however, the court also read Simmons
to limit the scope of the federal statute.124 Nevertheless, because the majority
opinion in Powell did not address its substantive implications, the court in Miller
did not have to distinguish why Powell's rationale dictated the outcome in
Simmons. The court in Miller was thus free to hold that Simmons is a substantive
rule and, therefore, retroactive in application.
V.

CONCLUSION

The inconsistency between the Fourth Circuit's opinions in Powell and
Miller raises the following questions: When the line between a procedural and
substantive rule is blurred such that the same court can reach opposite

117. United States v. Powell, 691 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 2012).
118. Id. at 559.
119. Id. at 559-60.
120. Id. at 560 (King, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 564.
122. Miller v. United States, 735 F.3d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 2013).
123. Id. at 144-45 (citing United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2011); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (2013)).
124. Id. at 146.
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conclusions when faced with similar issues, can the existing framework hold?
And if the framework holds, where is the line between substantive and
procedural rules drawn when the line is blurred? Fortunately, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Miller and Judge King's dissent in Powell demonstrate that,
although the line may be blurred, the framework remains salvageable. Judge
King explicitly argued in Powell that a rule with procedural import and a
substantive impact should ultimately be found to be substantive. Thus, when a
rule that alters a procedure employed by a judge serves to alter the class or
narrow the conduct, that rule should be deemed substantive and retroactive on
collateral review. This approach is essentially the one taken by the Fourth
Circuit in Miller. Although the court did not explicitly adopt Judge King's
rationale, 125 it acknowledged that Simmons had a procedural impact but that this
procedural impact narrowed the class of conduct. 6 Thus, the court's approach
in Miller better recognizes the capacity for blurred lines, while still preserving
the existing framework, and provides a way forward for the Fourth Circuit in
future cases.
The Fourth Circuit may soon provide additional guidance in distinguishing
between substantive and procedural rules. On January 13, 2014, the Supreme
Court granted Joseph K. Newbold's petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated
the Fourth Circuit's previous order denying his § 2255 motion. Newbold had
challenged whether "his predicate convictions . . . qualified him as an armed
career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act."1 27 The court denied him

relief, reasoning that "[u]nder Powell, Carachuri-Rosendo and Simmons do not
afford Newbold habeas relief."
The Supreme Court, however, vacated his
judgment and remanded his case to the Fourth Circuit "for further consideration
in light of . .. Miller v. United States."l29 Accordingly, this blurred line may
soon be brought into focus.

125. Judge King was part of the panel that decided Miller, but the opinion does not cite to
Judge King's dissent. See id. at 142.
126. See id. at 145-46 (stating that because Simmons narrowed the scope of the statute, its
effect is substantive).
127. United States v. Newbold, 490 F. App'x 614, 615 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
924(e) 2012)).
128. Id.
129. Newbold v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 897 (Mem.) (2014).
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